

# Public Key Cryptography

**Some crypto is actually really useful!**

# Hashing for Fun and Security

## Hash Functions

- A **hash function** is a mathematical function that turns a very large input into smaller integer. It must be fast to compute. (most of the time, see passwords)
  - Example: SHA256 turns any file (of any size) to a 256-bit number

```
~/CSC346/demo/pubkey $ ls -l
total 1112
-rw-r--r--@  1 fischer  staff  566695 Nov 20 16:45 x-wing.jpg

~/CSC346/demo/pubkey $ cat x-wing.jpg | shasum -a 256
5f120902fbb711c3976aacd36a0dcc4f7d9652ae535305e751b169ad0f775a53  -
~/CSC346/demo/pubkey $
```

# Hashing for Fun and Security

## Hash Functions

- The best hash functions are irreversible, meaning that there is no known way to find a file, if you are given the hash
- Always possible to do a brute-force search, but if the output is very large, it is impossible to complete in time
  - 256 bits =  $2^{256}$  possible hash  
= more than the atoms in the universe

# Hashing for Fun and Security

## Verification

- Suppose you have a file, which you hope is the right version, but you worry that an attacker has corrupted it.



# Hashing for Fun and Security

## Verification

- If you can get the hash of the file (in a trusted way), then you can use that to confirm you have the right file.



# Hashing for Fun and Security

## Verification

- Using hashes for verification is very common
  - Distribute a file through an untrusted source (shared distro site, BitTorrent, etc.)
  - Display the hash on a trusted website
- Remember Password Authentication?
  - Compare login password hash to stored hash value
  - Having “slow” hashes for passwords is actually a security feature! Helps mitigate brute force attacks

# Symmetric Cryptography

- A **symmetric cipher** is an encryption algorithm where the encoder and decoder use the same key
  - Often fast
  - Only option until a few decades ago
- Examples:
  - Substitution ciphers
  - WW2 “Enigma” machines

# Symmetric Cryptography

- Since the endpoints have to share keys, there are several problems:
  - Have to communicate the key beforehand, safely (hard to do on the Internet!)
  - Have to create different keys for each (a,b) pair
    - Every computer would have to store 1000s of keys (one for each partner)



# Public Key Infrastructure to the Rescue

## Big Brains

- Public key encryption algorithms require **two different keys** to encrypt & decrypt a message.
  - If you attempt to decrypt using the same key as you encrypted, you get garbage
- These algorithms work in both directions:
  - A will decrypt data encoded by B, and
  - B will decrypt data encoded by A

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Public & Private Keys

- In any **key pair**, we designate one as public, and one as private.
- We assume that the public key is accessible to **anyone, anywhere**
  - “Even my worst enemy”
- The private key must be **absolutely private**, not shared with anyone

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Public & Private Keys

- It's easy to generate new key pairs. You probably have one for:
  - Each web browser you use (each browser on your computer will have a different key pair)
  - Each library that supports https
  - Connecting to servers via ssh
  - Each https server you create
  - and many more...

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Public & Private Keys

- However, we assume that each endpoint in a communication has the same key pair, so long as the communication is ongoing.
- Not normally necessary to re-generate key pairs unless they're stolen; you can use the same one for a very long time.
  - SSH Key-Pairs are usually very long lived
  - TLS *certificates* expire in a year these days, but the *underlying Key-Pair* can be used again to generate a new certificate.


# Public Key Infrastructure

## Two Tricks


- The public/private key pair can be used in two directions:
  - Encrypt with public, decrypt with private
    - Gives privacy
  - Encrypt with private, decrypt with public
    - Gives authentication

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy




- A wants to send a message to B, but wants to make sure that the attacker cannot read it.




# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy



B's Public Key

- B has made a public-private key-pair and disseminated the ***public key***, well, publicly.
- Only B has the ***private key***




B's Private Key



B's Public Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy



- A composes a message to send to B



B's Public Key



B's Private Key




B's Public Key



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy



- A uses the public key of B to encrypt the message



B's Public Key




B's Private Key



B's Public Key


# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy




B's Public Key

- A sends the message to B
- The attacker also steals a copy of the message




B's Private Key



B's Public Key



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick One - Privacy



B's Public Key

- B can decrypt the message with the private key
- The attacker gets only gibberish when trying to decrypt with B's public key



B's Private Key





B's Public Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication




- B wants to send a reply to A, but the attacker wants to send a fake reply to A





# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication




B's Public Key

- B wants to send a reply to A, but the attacker wants to send a fake reply to A




B's Private Key



B's Public Key



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication




B's Public Key

- B can encrypt the message with B's private key
- The attacker does not have B's private key, so tries to encrypt it with B's public key




B's Private Key




B's Public Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication





B's Private Key



B's Public Key


- Both messages are sent to A



B's Public Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication



- Both message are sent to A
- A uses B's public key to decrypt each message
- Only the authentic message can be decrypted



**B's Private Key**




**B's Public Key**




# Public Key Infrastructure

## Trick Two - Authentication



- How do we know that the message is garbled?
- The message includes a HASH of the message
- If the hash included matches a hash of the “message” that was decrypted, then you know the message is authentic.





# Public Key Infrastructure

## Bi-Directional Communication?






- How do we communicate securely in both directions?
- A and B each have their own key-pair
- Public Keys are exchanged




# Public Key Infrastructure

## Bi-Directional Communication?



- A and B can communicate securely through a careful exchange of messages encrypted with the other's public key
- Attacker is grumpy and goes looking for easier targets



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange


- How do we get everyone's Public Keys?
- Too many servers and clients to just assume everyone has everyone's public keys



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange

- How do we get everyone's Public Keys?
- If the client has the host's public key, you can use that to send the public key of the client to the host as part of the message.



Website's Public Key



Client's Private Key




Website's Private Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange

- Encrypt the client's public key with the public key of the Website



Website's Public Key



Client's Private Key



Website's Private Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange


- Encrypt the client's public key with the public key of the Website



Website's Public Key



Client's Private Key



Website's Private Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange

- Website can decrypt the message with it's private key
- Now the website has the client's public key and secure bi-directional communication can take place



Website's Public Key



Client's Private Key



Client's  
Public Key




Website's Private Key



# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange

- But how does the client get the Website's public key in the first place?



Website's Public Key



Website's Private Key

# Public Key Infrastructure

## Key Exchange

- We can't just ask for it. How could we trust that it's really the website giving us the public key?
- Attacker could impersonate the website and we may not know.



# Certificates


## Certificate Authority

- A **certificate** is a document, signed by a trusted third party – a “**certificate authority**” or CA – that tells us what the public key of a server is.
- We use certificates, instead of talking to the CA directly, because the load on the CA would be immense.

# Certificates

## Certificate Authority




- While it is not possible for a client to innately know the public key for every conceivable service out there, it is possible for the client to have innate knowledge or trust for a smaller fixed set of keys.
- Your Operating System ships with an initial set of trusted keys in the form of root or intermediary certificates.



# Certificates

## Certificate Authority




- A and B both trust C, a certain Certificate Authority.
- When we begin, both A and B know C's public key, but they do not know each other's.
- We want B to come to know A's public key – after which we can communicate (as shown earlier).



# Certificates

## Certificate Authority


- A first demonstrates to the CA that it is who it says it is
- This is usually done through DNS records
- A can then send it's Public Key to the CA



# Certificates

## Certificate Authority



- Once the CA knows A's Public Key, the CA creates a message that basically says "As the CA, you can trust that this is indeed A's Public Key"
- The CA includes a Hash of the message in a Certificate that is signed with the CA's Private Key



# Certificates

## Certificate Authority

- The CA then sends this Certificate back to A
- A can now hold on to this certificate for a relatively long time
- Most certificates issued today are good for a maximum of one year







# Certificates

## Certificate Authority



- B can now talk directly to A and ask for A's certificate
- A sends it's certificate to B
  - This happens before HTTP communication, but after TCP socket connection



# Certificates

## Certificate Authority



- B can verify the signature of the certificate by decrypting it with CA's Public Key
- B finally knows A's Public Key, and can trust that it is correct, because B trusts CA



# Certificates

## Chain of Trust


- This is a very basic example of the Chain of Trust
- “I can trust this new thing, because it is signed by something I already trust”



# Certificates

## Chain of Trust

- Compared to the number of hosts on the internet, there are only a very small number of Root Certificate Authorities
- My Laptop knows and trusts 149 Root Certificates in 2024
- In 2022 it was a 163 Root Certificates. OS vendors take on the responsibility to maintain this initial trust list.
- You can add your own if needed.



# Certificates

## Chain of Trust

- A few hundred Root CAs cannot deal with Billions of requests for new certificates
- Therefore there are Intermediary Certificate Authorities
- Organizations that the Root CAs trust to sign certificates on their behalf



*Certificate Standard*

From: CA  
To: Anyone

Intermediary CA:

```
010100101010010101  
010010111010100101  
010111101010010101  
110101010001011011
```



  
CA Private



  
I-CA Private

*Certificate Standard*

From: I-CA  
To: Anyone

A's Public Key is:

```
01010010101001010101001011101  
01001010101111010100101011101
```

You can trust me:







# Certificates


## Chain of Trust

- The Certificate for our class was signed by the InCommon RSA Intermediary CA
- The InCommon RSA CA was in turn signed by the USERTrust RSA CA
- The USERTrust RSA CA is one of the initial Root CAs that come with most OS installations
- So our browser trusts the certificate



 **Safari is using an encrypted connection to fischerm.csc346.arizona.edu.**  
Encryption with a digital certificate keeps information private as it's sent to or from the https website fischerm.csc346.arizona.edu.

 USERTrust RSA Certification Authority  
↳  InCommon RSA Server CA 2  
↳  \*.csc346.arizona.edu

 **\*.csc346.arizona.edu**  
Issued by: InCommon RSA Server CA 2  
Expires: Wednesday, April 9, 2025 at 4:59:59 PM Mountain Standard Time  
✔ This certificate is valid

> Trust  
> Details